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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we present a dynamic model which explains output, enployment
and energy consumption in the French manufacturing sector in terms of the expected
and actual path of wage rates and energy prices in units of output. The model
has two distinguishing features: First, the rate of capacity utilization is
determined explicitly from profit—maximizing behavior and it is viewed as the
crucial adjusting variable in the short run. Second, we assume complete lack of
substitutability between capital, labor and energy inputs ex post.
The model is motivated by a brief discussion of French growth, focusing on
the decline of profitability and employment in manufacturing, and simulated using
annual data from 1950 to 1979. The wage explosion and the energy shock of the
early seventies are interpreted (in a model allowing for overhead labor) in terms
of changes in expected real factor prices,and their effects on the utilization
and the profitability of each vintage are quantified. Aggregating over vintages,
the model generates the observed decline in profitability and utilization of
existing capacity.
The results of the simulation are very encouraging, and a simultaneous
estimation of the model under static expectations is rejected by the data. There
are two limitations of the analysis which will be relaxed in further work. Invest-
ment is exogenous and open—economy aspects only appear indirectly, say via
constraints on the energy price and the price of output.
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In this paper, we present a dynamic model which explains output, employment
and energy consumption in the French manufacturing sector in terms of the expected
and actual path of wage rates and energy prices in units of output. The model
has two distinguishing features: First, the rate of capacity utilization is
determined explicitly from profit—maximizing behavior and it is viewed as the
crucial adjusting variable in the short run. Second, we assume complete lack of
substitutability between capital, labor and energy inputs ex post.
Accordingly, adjustment to changes in relative factor prices occurs only
slowly over time, as the existing capital stock is replaced by new capital and
by production techniques consistent with the new pattern of relative factor prices.
The putty—clay structure of production implies that profitability of new capital,
as measured, for example, by Tobin's q, can behave quite differently from the
profitability of old capital, a point often emphasized in recent discussions
about investment behavior. A further important implication of the putty-clay
assumption is that an abrupt increase in production costs may cause a discrete
reduction in the productive capacity, because old capacity can no longer be
profitably operated.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I motivates the model by a brief
discussion of French growth, focusing on the decline of profitability and
employment in manufacturing. The basic model is developed in Section II and
compared with the standard putty—putty model. We show that only in the stationary
equilibrium can we represent the relationship between output and factor inputs
in terms of a standard production function. We contrast this solution with the
one obtained when relative factor prices are not expected to change as well as
with the general case where factor prices are expected to change at different
rates.2
Assuming a fixed planned lifetime of each vintage, industry —wideoutput,
employment and energy demand are derived. The model, modified to allow for
overhead labor, is estimated and simulated using data on French manufac-
turing from 1950 to 1979 in Section III. The effects of changes in expected
real factor prices on the factor proportions of new plants are quantified as
well as the optimal rate of utilization and the profitability of each vintage.
When utilization and profitability are aggregated across vintages, their recent
decline is consistent with the decline in profitability and employment emphasized
in Section I. Extensions of the analysis are pointed out in the conclusion.
ISTYLIZED FACTS
The International Scene
The decade of the 1970's was a watershed in the economic development of the
old industrial countries. The erosion of monetary stability from the late 1960's,
the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, the first oil
shock, and the unprecedented increase in the prices of other raw materials in
1973/74 brought an end to a quarter of a century of high and stable growth at
full employment. The past ten years have been characterized by slow growth, high
unemployment, monetary instability, and inflation that is only now showing signs
of deceleration. Most importantly, the past decade has also brought to the surface
underlying long term tendencies of structural change in the world economy, caused
by demographic and technological changes, the competitive challenge of Japan and
of the newly industrialized countries, and the increase in the real cost of energy.
These developments in the global economy have affected Europe with particular
severity. Indeed, it had not really recovered from the global recession of 1974/
75 when the second oil shock and the 'dollar shock' of 1981/82 brought about the
recession in the midst of which we still are. The average rate of growth of the
European countries from 1973 to 1980 was only 1.6 per cent in comparison with an
average growth rate of 4.6 per cent in the previous decade. The performance of
the European countries after the 1974/75 recession contrasts with that of the3
United States. The 1974/75 recession was more severe in the United States than it
was in Europe, but from the second half of 1975 the United States experienced a
strong and sustained boom supported by expansionary fiscal and monetary policies.
Although Europe, too, recovered from the recession in 1976 supported by fiscal
stimulus and inventory build—up, the recovery was halted and growth remained slow
through the 1970's, as macroeconomic policies, particularly in Germany and France,
continued to emphasize disinflation.
The differences in strategies of economic policy adopted by the United States
on the one hand and Germany on the other, contributed to the depreciation of the
US dollar, culminating in the 'dollar crisis' of October 1978. The depreciation
of the dollar, viewed with alarm by the European goverments,helped the slowing down
of inflation in Europe while it also led to a deterioration in the price and cost
competitiveness and a decline in the profitability of European manufacturing.
As the boom of 1975/78 came to an end in the United States and macroeconomic
policies became more concerned with inflation, the dollar stabilized and in 1979
Europe showed clear signs of recovery while inflation was still decelerating.i/
The incipient recovery was, however, soon brought to an end first by the second
oil shock and then by the impact of the restrictive monetary policy adopted by the
United States. As a result of slow growth and structural changes, unemployment has
become a serious problem in all European countries. Indeed, the average unemployment
rate of the EEC countries has increased every year since 1973, from 3 per cent in
1973 to 8 per cent in 1981, and it is still increasing.
A further important aspect of the experience of the European economies in the
past ten years is the increase in government expenditure relative to GNP. The
average share of total government outlays in GNP in the European countries increased
from 36.5 per cent in 1970 to 45 per cent in 1978 —thelast year for which we have
data available. Although the tax burden increased in all countries, the increase
in tax revenue has been insufficient to keep up with the growth of government
expenditure. As a result, a structural deficit has emerged in the government
budget in most European countries.4
The French Experience
Until the Mitterand government, whose policies we do not plan to discuss in
this paper, the performance of the French economy has followed the general pattern
of the European countries, particularly that of Germany. From 1973 to 1981, the
rate of growth of GDP was only 2.6 per cent, whereas it had been 5.4 per cent in the
period 1949-73 2/. Like Germany and other European countries, France experienced
an aborted recovery in 1976. Decline of growth in manufacturing has been even
more abrupt: from 5.8 per cent in the post war period to only 1.7 per cent from
1973 to 1981. Behind this average decline are significant changes in the compo-
sition of industrial production. Thus, from, 1975 to 1980, the motor vehicle
and transportation industry increased at an annual rate close to 19% p.a. and
machinery and equipment goods increased at 14% p.a. while consumer goods, inter-
mediate goods and consumer durables increased only at about 10% p.a. at current
prices. 3/
Our focus is on the role of factor prices in explaining the aggregate decline
in manufacturing, but it should be mentioned that this structural change was in
large part engineered by the State. Briefly, industrial policy measures under
the so—called Barre Plan consisted of sustaining heavy manufacturing (nuclear
power, telecommunications and steel), encouraging high technology exports
(armament, aerospace, heavy engineering and food processing) 4/ and managing an
orderly contraction in traditional exports (textiles, shoes, handbags, clothing
and watches). 5/
Because of slow growth and demographic developments that caused a substantial
increase in labour supply, especially of women and young people, unemployment
became a particularly serious problem in France in the 1970's. The rate of
unemployment increased from 2.6 per cent in 1973 to close to 8 per cent in 1981.
High and increasing unemployment has however contributed little to the
moderation of inflation. In terms of consumer prices, inflation has remained
stubbornly above 9 per cent, averaging 10 per cent for the 1973—81 period.5
Unlike in many other countries during this period, consumer prices rose faster
than wholesale prices, which averaged 7.9 per cent for the same period.
Although French inflation has been higher than that of her major trading
partners, 6/ there has been little change in the price and cost competitiveness
of French industry from the early 1970's to l98l because of the depreciation of
the French franc, and higher than average productivity increase. 7/
As in all European countries, there has however been a substantial erosion
of profitability in the manufacturing sector. According to Table 1, the share
of the operating surplus in total manufacting output declined from an average
of 13 per cent in period 1963—73 to an average of 9 per cent in the period
1974—79. This decline was largely the result of an increase in the share of
total labour compensation from 33 per cent to 36 per cent. Despite the sharp
increase in the cost of energy, its share in gross output remained around
6 per cent because of a substantial reduction in the energy intensity of manu-
facturing production. The same occured with other intermediate inputs, whose
price did not however change substantially relative to the price of gross output.
Figure 1 further illustrates the erosion of profitability in the manufacturing
sector and suggests that this development started already before the first oil
shock. A similar pattern can be found for other European countries,
and it reflects the much discussed wage explosion of the late 1960's and the
early 1970's.B/6
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j963-73 33.2 5.5 12.8 48.5
1974—79 35•7 5.7 9•3 493
Gross outut (Q)andvalue added (X) in
(U4 + U5 + U6) from the DMS databank
industrial subsectors
Sources:(1) Total labor costs (TLC) obtained by adding the wage
bill (SALVS1), social security contributions by employers
(SCOCS) and fringe benefits (PSOCS1) for the subsectors
I =U4, 1J5,U6 from the DMS databank.
(3) Energy costs (EC) obtained by multiplying energy consumed
(including refinery losses) by category by its price in francs,
from UN, World Energy Supplies 1950—1974, and lEA, Energy














Source: Column (2) of Table 3 and 1980 estimate.
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Table 2 summarizes the evolution of the basic prices and quantitiesrelevant
to the manufacturing sector. Panel A, column (3) shows thatthe average rate
of increase of the product wage was close to 6% throughout the period,while
the real price of energy, which was constant from 1959 to 1973,increased
to about 6% in the following period. This was substantially in excessof the
"warranted" rates of increase implied by measured factor productivity growth,
obtained from Panel B as 4% p.a. and 2% p.a. respectively. 9/ The coverse
was true —particularlyfor energy —inthe period 1959—73. Column (1) of
Panel B shows that the rate of growth of output declined from 6.6% to 2.5%,
while labor input, which had been constant in the period 1959—73, declined at
a rate of 1.6% p.a. in 1974-79. While this is one of thecrucial facts behind
the French unemployment problem, it was in part due to the reduction inthe
length of the work week 10/. As mentioned, the increase in thereal price of
energy kept its use by the manufacturing sector constantin 1974—79, after an
increase of over 3% p.a. in 1959—73 (column 2 of Panel B).
Using consistent figures on gross (net) capital stockand gross investment in
manufacturing from SLN, 11/ we obtain annual growth rates of 5.5% (6.6%)and 8% per
annum respectively over 1959—73 and a drop to 4.7 (3.9)and —2.2% in 1974—79.
Similarily, survey data on capacity utilization show a drop from84.3% for 1959—73 to
83% in 1974—79. Using variables constructed in Section III below, and reported
in column (4) and (5), we see that corresponding to a drop in the rateof growth of
net capital from 7% to 4%, our measure of average optimal capitalutiliza-
tion would have dropped from 74% to72%. This is consistent with the
excess of observed over warranted factor price growth and is, of course,the
counterpart of the decline in profitability discussed above.9
TABLE2
FRENCHMANUFACTURING:
PRICE AND QUANTITIES (%p.a.)
A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Labor Wholesale Price of Product Real price of

























1959—73 6.6 0.5 3.4 7.0 73.9
1974—79 2.5 —1.6 0.4 3.7 71.7
Sources A (1) In mechanical and electrical industries. Includes requiredsocial
security contributions, from SLM, p. 225
(2)Fuel and energy for industries wage, value—added tax excluded, from SLM,
p. 219.
(3) Price of industrial goods, tax included, from IFS, line 63.
B (1) Gross output in industrial subsectors (U4 + U5 + U6), 1970 francs
from 5121, p. 78.
(2) Employment in industrial subsectors times average weekly hours
worked from SLM, p. 30, 33.
(3) Same as Table 1, column (2).
(5) SameasTable 5, column(2)
Note:The notation used for the series is the sameasin the text and in the Data
Appendix.10
II THE MODEL
We view the manufacturing sector as a collection of plants of differing
characteristics in terms of their production capacity, and labor and energy
requirements. These three crucial features are chosen at the time a plant is
built and define its vintage. We do not allow any flexibility in the choice of
the production technique pç nor do we allow any retrofitting of old plants,
although such possibilities are obviously a relevant consideration. A crucial
aspect of the actual behavior of firms is, in our view, the adjusting role of the
utilization of capacity. In other putty—clay models, changes in utilization
are, if anything, an afterthought. 12/
Our emphasis in this section is on the specification of a plant of a given
vintage. Unlike standard vintage models of growth, this turns out to be the
crucial building block of the model. 13/Because we take investment as
exogenous and focus on the utilization of different vintages, the analysis of
aggregation over plants is left until we deal with the problem of estimating an
industry—wide model in the next section.
The Basic Setup
When a plant is built, say in period t =i,the firm decides on initial invest-
ment, L, on the capacity of the plant and on the (effective) labor and energy
requirements per unit of capacity, which remain fixed for the lifetime of the
plant. A plant is closed down when the present discounted value of profits is
equal to zero.
The capacity of the plant declines over its lifetime because of physical depre-
ciation, which we assume for convenience to take place at a constant rate, .
Then,in period t,themaximum capacity of a plant built in period i, Z, is
given by:
—i — t—i —I (1) Z y1 u I (1 —S) =yu
Where y. and Uaredefined subsequently.11
Note that the maximum capacity of the plant is determined at the time it is constructed
and cannot be changed thereafter. However, in each period, maximum capacity can
be utilized more or less intensively, so that utilized capacity is given by:
(2) Z=y.uK
Where u/u =Z/Z
is the rate of utilization of capacity of plant i on
period t, relative to maximum capacity.




The output of the plant, X, increases with capacity utilization, but at
a diminishing rate. This reflects the fact that, as we approach maximum capacity
utilization, input productivity declines. Capturing this feature by a very simple
parametrization, ,wewrite our output function as:
(5) =y.(u) K
ii— 1 i Where (ut) =ut(u
—- u)
Note that maximum output is defined by u =u.
When the plant is constructed, the firm has to decide on how to allocate its
investment between capacity creation, labor saving and energy saving. For a given
level of investment, the firm can increase labor or energy productivity but at




Substituting from (1) through (5) into (6) we can write output as afunction






Note that, although (6) appears to be very similar to the standard production
function specification, our model impose strong restrictions on the choice of
N, E and u, which eliminate the apparent substitutability between labor, energy and
capital inputs ex post. Note further that it is the variationof capacity utili-
zation which allows one to discriminate between our specification and standard putty—
clay models. The difference between our specification and the standard putty—clay
models, where variable inputs are proportional to output, is also apparent from
equation (7).
The Maximization Problem
Given total investment, I., the technology of the plant is chosen so as to
maximize the present discounted value of expected profits. The time horizon of
this optimization problem, T., is endogenously determined. We assume that the firm is
competitive and takes both input and output prices as exogenously given. We measure
factor prices in units of output and denote the product wage prevailing at time
t by w and its expectation by where it is understood that expectations are
formed at t =i,when the investment decision is made. Similarily, we denote
the actual and expected real price of energy by s and respectively. A
further simplification is that expected profits are discounted at a constant
rate, r.
We now maximize the present discounted value of profits per initial investment,
denoted by ,subjectto the technology constraint in (5).13
The Lagrangian is written as:





[(1 —s)/ (1+ r)]t_i
1
is a Lagrange multiplier
and w. =w.,s. =s
1 1 1 1






The optimal rate of utilization is chosen each period according to realized real




According to (9), the marginal benefit in increased output from an increase is
utilization equals unit variable costs. Solving for the rate of utilization, we
obtain:
(10) u =(1— -
Where =a./y.u
b. =b./y.u 11 1
Thus, given the labor and energy output ratios, .and., u varies with con-
temporaneous (realized) real factor prices since a•, b. and y. are chosen at the
time the plant is built and remain fixed as long as the plant operates. Given the
lifetime of the plant, they are determined from the following first—order conditions:14
(11) =(ut) g-' =
()i___it—ii
(12) =— g+y a(y./a.) =0
(13) =-gtl+y(y./b)
=0
Where g =1—cS/i+ r
From (11) we see that the shadow cost of capital productivity is always
equalto the present discounted value of additional output. Substitutingfrom (11)
into (12) and (13), we get:
It—i I i'.'t—i
(12 ) a (ut) g
= (a1/y.)w g
(13') (ut) gt_i = (b./y.) gtl
The Choice of Technology
Using (10) to substitute for u and rearranging, we express (12')and (13')
as two quadratic equations in a.w. and b.s., with coefficients that arefunctions of
11 11
real factor prices relative to the ones prevailing in period i:
(14) (2—a)ii2 + (1—a) — — 2.w1iii+ ap =0








t—i t—i p = g/ (wtlw.) (sr/si) g
and v1having expressions in /s equivalent to P2and p In the
numeratorand the same denominator.15
Equations (14) and (15) define two hyperbolas in.w., .s.. 14/ There will always
be one intersection in the positive quadrant associated with the optimumsolution.
There is, however, no analytical solution in general. In some special cases,
an explicit solution can be obtained. One such case is whenthe relative
price of the two factors is not expected to change. Then we can aggregatelabor
and energy inputs into a single factor. In (14) and (15),p2 ="2=1and p =
sothat by adding we obtain:
(16) (.w. +.s.)2 (l+o) —2(.w.+ '.s.) + p (1—cr)=0
The negative root of (16) gives minimum variable costs: 15/
(17).w.+ =(i
—Jp2_(12)p )
Theexpression on the right—hand side of (1 )capturesthe effect of factor
price variablity on the choice of technology. Using (17) to substitut for








1 - — —(1-a2)
When factor prices are expected to remain constant, p1pl, the square root term
reduces to a, and H=1, so that variable costs are fixed:
(20) .w. + =iiii l+a16
In this case, the planned rate of capacity
utilization is also constant, and
independent of factor prices. In fact,using (20) in (10), we obtain:
(21) u = 2o
Recalling equation (7) above, we see that in this specialcase the standard
production function representation applies to ourspecification. We can then
interpret a,and a as the shares of labor, energy and capital costsin output.
When factor prices vary over the lifetime of the plant,the rate of utiliza—
tion also varies. When the relative price of the twofactors is constant, we
can use (18) and (19) to substitute for.and in (10) and we obtain the planned






Inthis case, there is no production function representationof technology
which is independent of factor prices. The term inutilization in (7) now
becomes:
(23) (u) =2+o (l+a —H.v)1
+ 0(1+ + H.v1)
The Life Span of the Plant
As we have noted, the planned lifetime of the plant dependson the expected
time path of factor prices. The actual lifetime ofthe plant may of course
be different to the extent that there are expectatiOnalerrors In general,17
the lifetime of a plant is a decreasing function of the rate of increase of
factor prices. This can be seen clearly in the spread case when both factor
prices increase at a constant rate, say p.In this case, the planned shut—off
date of the plant is given by setting u equal to zero in equation (22) above:
(24) H.(l + =i+o
Where H. depends on p as shown in equation (19) above.
In general, the cut—off point is determined jointly with the technology coeffi-
cients from (8'), (14) and (15).
Solution for the Plant
Our model of the plant is completely specified by equations (3), (4), (5),
(6), (8'), (14) and (15). When relative factor prices are not expected to change,




Substitutingfor y. in (18) and (19), we have:
(26) a. (mj.)h/0(/w.)° (/s.)°
(27) b. =(Jfl)1/0(/w.)0 (/)(la)/o
Note from (26) and (27) that the choice of technology at time i depends
not only on factor prices prevailing at time i but also on the time profile of
factor prices relative to their initial level. This latter effect, captured by
H., is symmetric because relative factor prices are expected to remain constant.
When factor prices are expected to be constant, the first effect is ruled out
and factor proportions are determined by a weighted average of prices prevailing
at time i.18
When a constant (common) growth rate for factor prices, i,is expected,
then an increase in p lowers H1 and therefore increaseslabor and energy
productivity.
We now write the solution under static expectations(H. =1)by substituting
a., b, and y. in (3), (4) and (6),to yield:
(28)X = U°°(a/w.) (/s.)° [(1 + a)2 -v2]K
(29) N
=U11° (a/w.)1(/s.)° (1 + a -v)K
(30) E'U11° (/w.)° (s/s.) (1 + a -v5K'
t 1 1 tt
Ingeneral, equation (7) above holds and itindicates the relationship between
our model and the standard productionfunction for a plant. Before proceeding with
with the estimations, we discuss the aggregationof plants.
Aggregation
In any given period the manufacturing sectorconsists of a collection of plants
withdifferent labor and energy requirements. Thosedifferences exist because
theplants have been built in different periods,with old technologies influenced
by past as well as expected current andfuture factor prices. It is important
to note that, even with perfect foresight,different vintages would embody different
technologies except in the special case whenfactor prices are constant. Errors
in expectations add another consideration. Ifvariable costs turn out to be
higher than anticipated, labor and energy productivitiesof older vintages are
smaller than would have been optimal with perfect foresight,and old plants will
be shut—off sooner than anticipated. This is obviously an importantconsidera-
tion in view of the unanticipated increase in energy costin the 1970's.19
Because of differences between vintages, thereis no aggregate production
function in our model. An aggregate productionfunction exists only in the
stationary case of constant expected andactual factor prices.
A further important cause of differences between vintagesis embodied tech—
noligical progress. We can easily captureit by adding shift parameters A. and
B. in equations (3) and (4). We also assume afixed planned lifetime of T years





(32)N = aA. u1 K' ;
tutt 1




To implement empirically the aggregate system in (31) through(33), we
make the following simplifying assumptions. We neglect embodied technological
progress (i.e. set A.=B11 above) but allow for labor—augumentingtechnological
progress. We assume that the manufacturing sectorfaces the same product
wage and real prices of energy, the sameandcoefficients and the same maximum
utilization rate u. In fact, we have no way of identifying u, so that itwould
be appropriate to interpret the parameter U defined in (28) through (30) as a
scale parameter. But U involves u raised to (i+o)/ and therefore, when esti-
mating c and t3, we have to set u =1.Since actual real factor prices are not
subject to choice and affect all vintages indentically, wealso treat them as
scale parameters and reinterpret (26) and (27) in terms of a measure of expec—
tational errors defined as the ratio of actual to expected real factor prices, to
yield, under stationary expectations:
(34)a. =(l+o)l/O(awl) (1-)/c I°
w s
—l/cI c/oi(l-c)/o-a/a
(35)b. =(l+o) (aw )(r ) w S
1 t t t t
Where =wLw. t t1
Tit =st/si
Note that (34) and (35) are applicable when real factor prices are expectedto
change at the same rate because H does not depend on or 1T. Then, according
to (18) and (19), w. and s. would have to be divided by H.. When relative
1 1 1
factor prices are expected to vary, however, we have to solve (14) and (15),
given a and and then simulate the model.
In this Section, we introduce a feature excluded from the model In
Section II for expositional convenience. This is the existence of overhead
labor, which we assume to be proportional to capacity.21
To equate the variables in (31) through (33) with observed gross output 17/,
employment and energy demand, we define a scale parameter C. for each of the
three equations,which (since u =1)reflects the particular units in which the
observed variables are measured as well as embodied technical progress. In
the employment equation, another scale parameter is implicity included in the





To determine a, f, n and the C's in the system (36) through (38) we use a
full—information maximum likelihood procedure based on K, w and for each
vintage, then we aggregate over vintages. The estimation is carried out subject




Themodel is estimated over the period 1950 through 1979 with annual data.
We use a reported (net) capital stock estimate for K, i =1950,assume that
all vintages prior to 1950 are identical and form K using gross investment in
year t>i, under the assumptions that=.10and T =30years. 18/ Expectations
are discounted at a rate of 10% p.a., so that g =.82.22
The model is estimated under static expectations, that is to say the case
when a. and b. are related by linear equations (18) and (19) rather than by the
quadratic equation (14) and (15). The model is also simulated for the general
case of equations (14) and (15) but conditional on postulated values for a and
which we take to be close to the ones reported in Table 1 above.19/ The latter
simulation also includes the assumption of a constant growth of the product wage
of 3% p.a. over the whole period, reflecting in part labor—augumenting technical
change, and a constant expected real price of energy. 20! The shocks of the
seventies are then simulated on variants of the dynamic base case.
Estimation results for the two cases are reported in Table 3. Because of the
different values of a and 13, the estimates are not directly comparable. Also, for
the period 1950—58 the results are less reliabe because of the greater weight of
the arbitrary base value of the capital stock and of changes in the system ofnational
accounts, which implied a different definition of the manufacturingsector. 21!
As shown in the third panel, the first—order serial correlation of theresiduals
is generally very high. Nevertheless, the likely misspecification of the
process of capital accumulation, due to the effect of variations in depre-
ciation rates and in scrappage as a function of changes in expected profita-
bility, might well introduce higher—order auto—regressive errors, which are
not corrected for. The existence of inequality constraints precludes
explicit significance tests on the parameters a and 13 reported in the first panel
of Table 3. Because of the constraints, there is no guarantee that the error terms
to be orthogonal to the dependent variable. Therefore, the summary statistic
R2 reported in Table 3, second panel, is actually the square of the correla-
tion coefficient between fitted and actual values. This is a good indicator
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The scale parameters (and the coefficients of auto-correlation) have an
asymptotically normal distribution: significance tests based thereon are
reported in parentheses below the coefficients in the first panelof Table
3 which, again, are not directly comparable. The overall significance test
of the regression has a 2distribut1on, whose value is reported in the second
panel.
In the case of static expectations, reported in the first column, the
coefficient on overhead labor has the wrong sign. To interpret the result
that large expectational errors cause and to vary considerably. If a and
13 were large, large variations in v would result, the utilization ratewill be
driven toward zero and could become negative. Since negativeutilization leads
to scrappage of the plant, the maximum likelihood values of aand 13 are likely
to be small when the environment is characterized by large expectational errors.
On the other hand, under static expectations, the standard production function
representation applies so that we expect a and 13 to be close to theshares of
labor and energy in gross output shown in Table 1.Since the values of a and 13
reported in Table 3 are implausibly low, even taking into account technological
change, (which would justify the assumption of a constant effective wage)
we conclude that static expectations do not capture the behavior ofFrench
manufacturing sector firms during the sample period.
The second column reports maximum—likelihood estimates of the scale para-
meters conditional upon the choice of a and 13.Figures 2 through 4 plot the
actual and fitted values for the three equations over the whole sample period
and it is clear that the model can explain a substantial portion of thevaria-
tion in output, employment and energy consumption in changes in utilization
rates across vintages and suggests the usefulness of this approach.The fit is
worse in the fifties, no doubt due to the greater weightof the base period— fitted
FIGURE 2
ACTUAL AND FITTED VALUES IN THE
DYNAMICCASE: OUTPUT EQUATION (BILLION OF 1970 FRANCS)
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FIGURE3
ACTUALAND FITTED VALUES IN
THE DYNAMICCASE: EMPLOYMENT EQUATION (BILLION MAN-HOURS)
Source: 1959—79 1971 base employment linked to1950—59 1956 base employment
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capital stock. Accordingly, Figure 5 plots index values of a and b1 from 1959 to
1979, with base 1973=100. There is a continuous decline in a. whereas b is almost
flat until the late sixties. Conversely, during most of the 1974—1979 period, b.
declines more than a.. A similar pattern would obtain under static expectations,
in part because we took a fairly high rate of depreciation and discount. Neverthe-
less, because of the expectation of a 3% increase in wages in the dynamic simula-
tion, the values of a. and b. are uniformly lower than under static expectations.
Changes in Factor Price Expectations
In general, when there are changes in expected factor prices, there will be
3r:setting changes in the factor proportions of new vintages and in the utili-
zation rate of old vintages. Specifically, differences in a., b. and u. across
vintages derive from differences in c, 3 and ,aswell as inand To reflect
the shocks of the seventies documented in tables 1 and 2, suppose that in 197L
expectations of factor prices change. If product wages are expected to grow at
5 rather than 3% p.a., there will be a decline of 12.5% in a. and a decline of
% in b. relative to the base dynamic case we have been discussing. Conversely
if the real price of energy is expected to increase at 3% p.a., so that the two
rates are the same, there will be animmediate decline of 14% in b. and a decline
of 1% in a.. Suppose now that both factor price expectations change, so thatwages
are expected to grow at 5% and energy prices are expected to grow at 3% p.a. Then
the decline for a. is 13% and for b. it is 17%. In all these examples, we observe
negative cross—effects.
The implications of changes in factor price expectations on the utilization
of the various vintages suggest that newer vintages will be more utilized than30
old vintages. Indeed, under static expectations (but with the assumed values of
a and ),in1979 we would find negative utilization rates of the 1950 and 1951
vintages. Utilization rates taking 1979 as the base period are shown in Figure 6.
Neglecting again the observations for the early fifties, we see that the utili-
zation of the 1959 vintage in 1979 is 58% and that an increase in expectational
errors brought about by a 10% increase in the 1979 product wage leads to a
drop in utilization of the 1959 vintage to 51%. For comparison, the utilization
rate would have been 44% under static expectations.
The Average Utilization Rate
A measure of average utilization of the capital stock in each year can be
obtained by aggregating the utilization rate of each vintage in operation in
that year. This measure, denoted by u*, is reported in Figure 7 for the base
dynamic case. It shows a decline, from 76% in 1959 to 71% in 1979. The evolu-
tion mirrors the one of measures based on the output gap or survey data from the
later sixties but the increase in the early sixties is not reflected in our
measure, possibly because of the weight of the base period capital stock.
In Table 4, we simulate again the shocks of the seventies by showing the
/
effectsof changes in expected factor prices on u as a proportion of the dynamic
base case of column 2 of Table 3. As before, we have set the expected rate
of growth of wages at 5% in column 1, the expected rate of growth of energy
prices at 3% in column 2 and combine both shocks in column 3. While the year—
to—year changes in a. and b. were negligible relative to the change inthe year
of the shock, the opposite holds for u*, where the impact effect is very small
compared to the effect in 1979. Comparing the effect of the wage and oil
shocks in Table 4, we see that the response of average utilization is much
more significant in columns 1 and 3 than it is in column 2, as suggested above
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Base Case Expected Expected Energy Combination
Wage Increase Price Increase
1973 73.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1974 73.9 0.1 0.0 0.2
1975 72.2 0.7 0.4 0.9
1976 71.6 2.7 2.3 2.8
1977 71.1 3.1 2.7 3.3
1978 70.5 3.5 2.9 3.7
1979 70.6 3.5 2.8 3.7
(1) Series reported in Figure 8 (p =.03,v =0)
(2) p =.05,=0in 1973, percent over base case
(3) p .03, v =.03in 1973, percent over base case
(4) p.05,-= .03in 1973, percent over base case34
Prof itabil)r
Finally, to present data on the profitabilityof manufacturing, we have to
correct our measure of output for non—energy rawmaterials. Taking their share
in output as constant over the period (as suggested byTable 1), we can compute
profits for each vintage as a percentage of net output.In the dynamic base case,
we see that, if the share is one half of gross output,then profitability declined
from about 24% in 1953 to 14.5% in 1958, increased to 19.3%in 1961 and slowly
declined to about 14% in the mid sixties. After a drop to10% in 1969—70,
this measure falls rapidly to 2.3% in 1975 and zerothereafter. Since the
share of raw—materials also changes, we show in Table5 the rate of profit for
the share of 50% and 40%. In the latter case, profitabilitydoes decline sub-
stantially in the seventies, as suggested by Figure1 above, but the rate of
profit in 1979 is still about 5%. Notefurther that, measuring profits by
vintage, we see that in 1979 no vintage before1956 would be in operation and
similarily that 1950 vintages would have been scrappedafter 1975.35
TABLE5
PROFITABILITYOF MANUFACTURING













Note: Measured as a weighted average (using gross outputs weights) of profitability
by vintage defined as (yy.q(u)36
CONCLUS TON
The results reported in Section III have to be regarded as indicativeof
the usefulness of the approach defended in this paper rather than precise
estimates. Our interpretation of the decline of profitability in SectionI
emphasized the importance of the wage explosion of the late sixties,continued
into the seventies, as well as the effect of the oil shock. Since our model
recognizes that it takes time to adjust factor proportions to factor price
shocks and that it takes longer the lower the rate of capital formation, we
were able to compare the effects of a sudden change in the priceof energy to
the effects of an increase in the expected rate of growth of real wages. We
found that, as suggested by Figure 1, the decline in profitability started
before the oil crisis, but that the energy shock was responsible for making older
vintages unprofitable sooner than anticipated. The greater share ofthe wage
bill in gross output was one reason for the stronger effect of wage growth in
factorproportions but the effect of expectational errors was also found to be
important incontrastingresults under static expectations to the dynamic simu—
lation of the model.
Thisbeing said, the limitations of the analysis should be borne in mind.
The most serious ones are certainly the omission of investment and of the
international aspects, which only appear here indirectly through the energy
shock or some constraint on the price of output. These items as well as a
refinement of the estimation procedure in the present set—up are in the authors'
research agenda.37
NOTES
1/A "European perspective" on this period can be found in Giersch (1981).
2/On secular French growth, see Carrd, Dubois and Malinvaud (1972). The
comparative perspective emerging from Maddison (1977) also suggests that
France was a late starter in the process of modern economic growth. The rate
of output in the later 19th century (1870—1913), 1.6% p.a., was substan-
tially below the average of sixteen industrial countries, 2.8% p.a.. The
same is true of the first half of the 20th century (1913—1949), where the
French growth rate was 1.4% p.a. and the average 1.9%. After the Second
World War, however, France caught up (5.3% vs. 4.8% in 1949—72) and con-
tinued above average in the seventies. In terms of manufacturing, there
was a narrowing of the differential in the postwar "belle epoque" and a
relative French decline in the seventies, as documented in Giersch (1981,
chap 4).
3/A detailed study of the changing structure of output in France during the
fifties and sixties, as well as of the changes within manufacturing can
be found in Dubois (1974). More recent accounts are in De1estr (1979)
and Collet et al. (1980)
4/There were "six sectors of the future'1 selected by the Committee for the
Orientation and Development of Strategic Industry (CODIS): bioengineering,
marine industries, robots, electronic office equipment, consumer electronics
and alternative energy technologies. See Joint Economic Committee (1981,
chap 2) for an insightful description of industrial and credit policy in
France. Using principal components analysis, Rigal (1982) identifies three
turning points during the period 1965—79. In 1969, investment was higher
in food products, some equipment (mechanical, household appliances, automobile),
construction and services to firms and lower in agriculture, energy (coal38
electricity, natural gas and water), consumption goods (leather—shoes and
textile—clothing), home equipment (naval, aircraft, weapons) and transportation.
In 1972, agriculture and energy continue to decline but are now joined by
food products and construction; equipment and services accelerate while
consumption goods pick up thanks to drugs and wood furniture. In 1978, energy
and services have the higer investment ratio, while manufacturing declines,
with the exceptions noted in the text.
5/The present stance on this aspect is less sanguine but the emphasis on the
high technology has, if anything, increased. According to the 1982—83 interim
development plan, spending on research and development is to rise from 1.8%
of GDP in 1980 to 2.5% by 1985 and in the 1982 budget, aid to industry by the
Economic and Social Development Fund (FDES) is to increase by 52.4%. To what
extent the managers of the newly nationalized firms will be able to find the
incentives to pursue this goal remains, of course, to be seen.
6/Historically, the single exception is the deflation of 1873—96 which was
smaller in Germany (—.1% p.a.) and Italy (—.3%). In the 1920—34 period,
for example, consumer price deflation (excluding Germany) was —2.2% p.a.
on average when in France there was 2.1% inflation.See Schwartz (1973)
and Giersch (1981, chap. 4).
7/Griliches and Mairesse (1982, p. 6) mention a "push" type explanation for
the faster productivity growth in France relative to the U.S. They present
evidence against explanations of the productivity slowdown, based on the invest-
ment shortfall and on the increase in the price of raw materials, as hypo—
thesised by Bruno (1981). They also find some effect of R & D on productivity
at the firm level but not at the industry level.
8/Comparative perspectives are provided by Nordhaus (1972), Gordon (1977) and
Sachs (1979). Due to data availability, we could not present figures before39
1963 in Table 1. The ratios usually reported refer to all non—financial
enterprises, of which only half are manufacturing firms. There arealso
no series on the price of non—energy intermediate inputsand the series
on the wholesale price of energy is an index (used below).
9/A brief reference to developments since 1979 maybeappropriate here. As
shown in Figure 1, the operating surplus declinedfurther in 1980 but
relative shares remained in line with the average forthe period since 1974,
so that there was a swifter adaptation to thesecond oil shock than to the
first. This is in large part due to a greater control overlabor costs,
even taking the minimum wage increase of June1981 into account. In fact,
using quarterly data on the ratio of unitlabor costs to value added deflators
in manufacturing relative to major trading partners,from IFS (base 1975=100)
we see a decline from 104 in the first quarterto 98 in the fourth, and an
increase to 99 in the first quarter of 1982. Nowthe labor share in French
manufacturing alone declined from 102.2 to 98.6from the first to the fourth
quarter of 1981, and is provisionally put at99.1 and 98.7 in the first two
quarters of 1982.
10/ Legislation enacted in January 1982 implied areduction of 4.5% in the legal
number of hours worked per year, due to a reductionof the work week and
an increase in the length of paid vacation. Note that takinginto effect the
length of paid vacation and the incidence of strikes on theannual average as
hours worked as in Mairesse and Saglio (1971, p. 114) would lower the estimate
of N in Table 2 in 1956, 1963 and above all, 1968 and 1969.
11/ We are grateful to Mr. P. Artus for this precious reference.40
12/ While this is true of the exhaustive work on putty—clayof Johansen (1972,
esp. p. 35), mention should bemade of a sizable literature on capital
utilization which concentrates on shift—work and "rhythmic input prices" e.g.
Winston (1974) and (1977) and Betancourt and Clague (1981). Also, a model
of utilization, focusing on investment demand is in Abel (1981).
13/ See in particular Johansen (1959), Solow (1962), Solow et al. (1966) and Cass
and Stiglitz (1970). Empirical implementations in a growth context are in
Bliss (1965) for England, Benassy et al. (1975), Fouquet et al. (1978) and
Vilares (1980) for France, Sandee (1976) for Holland and Bentzel (1979) for
Sweden. Other useful references are Salter (1966), Attiyeh (1967), Johansen
(1972), Isard (1973), Fuss (1977), Anderson (1981) and Bean (1981).
14/ The equation for these hyperbolas can be derived by rotating the axes by
one half of an angle whose contangent is given by (2—a)2+8aii2/2(l—a) for
(14) and minus (2—6)v2+p2/2(1—) for (15) and defining a new origin.
Details are available upon request.
15/ The positive root is .w. + = 1for both equations. It implies from
(10) that u. =0and is associated with an indefinite form for H.
16/ A justification of the fixed life assumption in French manufacturing appears
in Atkinson and Mairesse (1978).41
17/ Strictly speaking, we should have netted out non—energy intermediate inputs,
and thus adjust a andmeasured relative to gross output as in Table 1.
Because of the nearly fixed relative price, however, this adjustment would
only affect the scale parameter. Also a only reflects the share of produc-
tion labor.
18/ See Carr, Dubois and Malinvaud (1972) and Mairesse (1972) for a detailed
studies of the French capital stock. See also Delestr (l979b) and SLM.
Note that a lifetime of 30 years is substantially higher than the one chosen
in other estimates —seeMairesse (1972 p. 59) —evenwithout allowing for
the distinction between equipment and buildings. The present combination
probably allows for too little disembodied capital augmenting technical
progress, which was found by Mairesse (1977) and (1978) to be important in
the French case. A 5% rate of depreciation would come closer to the mark but
then the series on net capital would be almost double of the corresponding
series reported in SLM, whereas with a 10% depreciation, the two seriesare
very close.
19/ Expected computing costs prevented a simultaneous estimation ofa, ,nand
the C's in the dynamic case but we obviously intend to perform it. The
details of the estimation procedure are available upon request.
20/ See Table 2. Alternative estimates of disembodied technicalprogress are
4.3% in Mairesse and Saglio (1971, p. 107), 2.6% for labor and —.9% forcapital
in Benassy, Fouquet and Malgrange (1975, p. 35) and 2% in Mairesse (1978).
21/ From 1959 to 1979, data is based on the 1971 "enlarged system of national
accounts" (SECN) and includes investment by private firms in three subsectors
or "branches", intermediate goods (code U04), machines (U05) and consumption42
goods (U06). From 1950 to 1959, however, it is based on the 1962 system,
which divides manufacturing into seven branches (denoted U06 to U12) and
some national firms such as the Commissariat d'Energie Atornique are
included (in U1OB). To the difference in firm coverage (CEA in, some
aeronautics firms out) we ahve to add the difference due to the exclusion
of the deductible portion of the value-added tax. To give an example, the
new investment series (without VAT was 16.3% below the old one in 1971, but,
after accounting for the differences in definition, etc. the divergence
was reduced to —3.4%.The other series which are affected are employment
(56 classification over 1971 classification is 1.042 in 1959) and production
(similar ratio is .903 in 1959). Further details in INSEE (1978).43
DATA APPENDIX
w s X N E K
1950 34.5 93.5 120.7 10.2 1.07 68.1
1951 31.6 80.7 130.6 10.5 1.22 70.3
1952 37.3 90.6 131.9 10.4 1.20 72.5
1953 40.6 92.5 135.3 10.1 1.14 74.3
1954 43.6 94.9 141.7 10.2 1.21 75.1
1955 46.0 93.1 150.0 10.3 1.27 76.7
1956 50.9 96.4 163.9 10.5 1.44 79.2
1957 52.7 102.5 177.9 10.8 1.51 83.2
1958 54.4 105.1 183.8 10.8 1.47 87.3
1959 54.8 109.5 188.3 10.5 1.45 91.2
1960 56.2 105.3 210.5 10.7 1.51 96.4
1961 60.4 103.6 222.4 10.8 1.53 104.1
1962 65.8 103.7 238.1 11.0 1.57 113.0
1963 69.1 100.9 256.1 11.3 1.65 121.3
1964 72.7 98.7 273.1 11.4 1.76 129.4
1965 76.2 97.0 279.4 11.2 1.85 136.7
1966 79.0 96.3 303.6 11.3 1.89 145.3
1967 89.6 103.7 311.0 11.2 1.96 154.0
1968 90.7 96.9 324.3 10.9 2.09 162.1
1969 95.1 98.1 366.9 11.2 2.30 175.2
1970 100.0 100.0 390.7 11.4 2.65 190.1
1971 108.2 106.8 413.4 11.5 2.48 206.5
1972 116.9 105.2 442.1 11.6 2.43 222.8
1973 122.7 100.9 476.1 11.7 2.47 240.4
1974 120.8 121.1 494.2 11.7 2.55 254.8
1975 134.8 126.1 465.6 11.1 2.28 263.2
1976 144.9 127.9 505.0 10.9 2.41 273.7
1977 153.9 131.5 518.3 10.8 2.40 283.2
1978 165.3 133.4 529.7 10.5 2.47 291.7
1979 171.3 138.4 549.4 10.2 2.74 297.544
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